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THE EMERGING NEED FOR HYBRID
ENTITIES: WHY CALIFORNIA SHOULD
BECOME THE DELAWARE OF “SOCIAL
ENTERPRISE LAW”
Ross Kelley*
Recognizing the limitations and restraints posed on socially
conscious for-profit organizations, several states have begun to develop
a legislative model that blends attributes of traditional for-profit and
not-for-profit entities into “hybrid” organizations. Chief among these
states is California, which has emerged as a leader of this new social
enterprise reform. California is the only state to allow a business to
incorporate as a Benefit Corporation or a Flexible Purpose
Corporation. Additionally, the state legislature has proposed a third
type of hybrid entity—the Low-Profit Limited Liability Company. By
addressing the limitations of the traditional corporate structure,
California’s new hybrid entities afford directors, founders, and officers
not only with increased legal protection, but also promote confidence to
pursue social and environmental causes. This Article explains why
California is the preferred choice for social enterprises and how an
influx of social enterprises could benefit the state.

* J.D. Candidate, May 2014, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.S. in Finance and
Entrepreneurship, Washington University in St. Louis, May 2010. I am truly grateful to Professor
Therese Maynard for her continual guidance, seemingly infinite knowledge, and contagious
enthusiasm. I would also like to thank the editors and staffers of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review for their support and encouragement. Lastly, I would like to thank my parents, who not
only served as my personal writing tutors throughout my childhood, but also served as my
inspiration for this paper by teaching me that success can be measured any way you want to
define it.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, American businesses have measured their success
by their ability to maximize profits and, in turn, shareholder wealth.1
However, this narrow purview ignores a small but emerging group of
businesses that measure success not just by financial gains, but also
by evaluating the company’s social and environmental impacts.2
Dubbed “social enterprises,” the directors of these companies seek to
maximize profits while actively pursuing a social purpose.3 No two
companies have better embodied this evolving business philosophy
than Ben & Jerry’s, a Vermont-based ice cream manufacturer,4 and
Patagonia, a California-based outdoor-apparel retailer.5
Both Ben & Jerry’s and Patagonia trace their unwavering
dedication to social missions to their exuberant, steadfast founders.6
With the 1978 creation of Ben & Jerry’s, Ben Cohen and Jerry
Greenfield wanted to create not just a new ice cream flavor, but a
new ice cream experience.7 Similarly, Yvon Chouinard believed that
he could create better outdoor apparel and equipment, and created
Patagonia in 1972.8 As Ben & Jerry’s and Patagonia’s brands gained
recognition and their sales began to increase, the founders focused on
not just the bottom-line profits, but improving their communities as
well.9 Chouinard, Greenfield, and Cohen chose to veer away from
1. Anthony Bisconti, The Double Bottom Line: Can Constituency Statutes Protect Socially
Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 770 (2009).
2. Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 591 (2011).
3. Id.
4. Company Overview of Ben & Jerry's Homemade Inc., BUS. WK., http://
investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=109887 (last visited
July 7, 2013).
5. Company Overview of Patagonia, Inc., BUS. WK., http://investing.businessweek.com
/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=7901350 (last visited July 7, 2013).
6. See infra notes 7–10 and accompanying text.
7. Our History, BEN & JERRY’S, http://www.benjerry.com/company/history (last visited
July 7, 2013).
8. Company Info: Our History, PATAGONIA, http://www.patagonia.com/us/patagonia.go
?assetid=2047&ln=140 (last visited July 7, 2013). The original name of the company was
Chouinard Equipment. Id.
9. Cohen and Greenfield affectionately referred to this approach as the “double dip.”
Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, The Truth About Ben and Jerry’s, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV.
39, 39 (2012), available at http://www.ssireview.org/articles/entry/the_truth_about_ben_and
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the traditional corporate maxim that profits should be valued above
all else, and instead measured their companies’ success by using a
“double bottom line”: maximizing profits and social objectives.10
Both Patagonia and Ben & Jerry’s prescribed to this
dual-purpose approach, which ultimately led the companies to
develop and pursue similar societal and environmental initiatives.11
Patagonia and Ben & Jerry’s donated a percentage of their revenues
to charities,12 created and funded new charitable campaigns,13 paid
local vendors a premium for ingredients,14 limited their waste output
and carbon footprint,15 treated their employees better than their
competitors did,16 and even initiated campaigns to protect
_jerrys [hereinafter Page, Truth About Ben & Jerry’s]. Chouinard dubbed it the “slow company”
because of its long-term, sustainable focus. Firms with Benefits, ECONOMIST, Jan. 7, 2012,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/21542432.
10. See supra note 9.
11. See infra notes 12–17 and accompanying text.
12. Compare Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law
and the Sale of a Social Enterprise Icon, 35 VT. L. REV. 211, 219 (2010) [hereinafter Page,
Freezing Out Ben & Jerry], and Alicia E. Plerhoples, Can an Old Dog Learn New Tricks?
Applying Traditional Corporate Law Principles to New Social Enterprise Legislation, 13
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 221, 222 (2012) (stating that Ben & Jerry’s donated 7.5 percent
of pretax profits to charity), with Seth Stevenson, Patagonia's Founder Is America's Most
Unlikely Business Guru, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424052702303513404577352221465986612.html#articleTabs%3Darticle (stating that
Patagonia donates at least 1 percent of total revenues to grassroots causes).
13. Compare Page, Truth About Ben & Jerry’s, supra note 9, at 40, and Plerhoples, supra
note 12, at 222 (stating that Ben & Jerry’s created the Ben & Jerry’s Foundation), with Stevenson,
supra note 12 (stating that Patagonia created the "1% for the Planet" campaign).
14. Compare Page, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry, supra note 12, at 211, 220–21 (stating that
Ben & Jerry’s paid a premium for local Vermont milk, Brazilian nuts from impoverished villages,
and other Fair-Trade certified and organic ingredients), with Stevenson, supra note 12 (stating
that Chouinard switched “from conventional to organic cotton—despite the fact that it initially
tripled his supply costs”).
15. Compare Page, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry, supra note 12, at 221 (stating that Ben &
Jerry’s created eco-friendly packaging containers), with Marc Lifsher, Businesses Seek State's
New 'Benefit Corporation' Status, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2012, available at http://articles.latimes
.com/2012/jan/04/business/la-fi-benefit-corporations-20120104 [hereinafter Lifsher, Businesses
Seek] (stating that Patagonia uses sustainable manufacturing techniques), and Patagonia, Inc.,
B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/community/directory/patagonia (last visited Apr. 7, 2013)
(75 percent of materials used are recycled or environmentally preferred), and Stevenson, supra
note 12 (Patagonia created the Sustainable Apparel Coalition, which has “craft[ed] clear,
quantifiable standards for environmentally responsible clothing production”).
16. Compare Page, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry, supra note 12, at 223 (“Ben & Jerry's was
also committed to paying its employees a living wage and generous benefits, including being one
of the first companies to offer health care benefits to employees' same sex partners.”), and
Plerhoples, supra note 12, at 222 (“[T]he company disbursed five percent of the company's pretax
profits to employees as cash bonuses each year”), with Patagonia, Inc., supra note 15 (stating that
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endangered rain forests.17 In turn, Ben & Jerry’s and Patagonia’s
socially conscious management style yielded tremendous benefits for
each company’s employees, communities, and the environment.18
Even shareholders, satisfied with their stock returns, initially
supported their companies’ commitment to social causes.19 Given
these positive gains, Chouinard, Greenfield, and Cohen were
confident that their companies could sustain their societal and
environmental initiatives into the foreseeable future.20
Unfortunately for Cohen and Greenfield, some Ben & Jerry’s
shareholders began to question their founders’ societal enthusiasm as
the company’s financial growth—and thus the shareholders’
returns—slowed in the mid-1990s.21 Recognizing discontent among
some of Ben & Jerry’s investors, several companies staged takeover
attempts by tendering offers to the company’s shareholders.22 The
takeover attempts culminated in 2000, when Unilever, a
multinational consumer goods corporation, made a tender offer of
$43.60 per share to Ben & Jerry’s shareholders.23
Fearing that Unilever would undo Ben & Jerry’s longstanding
social and environmental initiatives to increase short-term profits,
Patagonia “extend[ed] health benefits to part-time, retail, [and] warehouse staff”), and Stevenson,
supra note 12 (stating that Patagonia offered free on-site day care and flex-time work hours to
employees).
17. Compare Page, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry, supra note 12, at 222 (describing Ben &
Jerry’s “Rain Forest Preservation” initiatives), with Christopher Pummer, Buttons May Help Save
Rain Forests, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1990, http://articles.latimes.com/1990-09-25/local/me
-1058_1_plastic-buttons (describing Patagonia’s campaign to save a 245,000-acre area in
Ecuador's Esmeraldas province).
18. Ben & Jerry’s social contributions and sales “grew impressively” in the 1990s. Page,
Freezing Out Ben & Jerry, supra note 12, at 221–24. Patagonia continued to increase its
environmental and social donations as it experienced “overambitious growth” in the late 1980s.
See Stevenson, supra note 12.
19. See Page, Truth About Ben & Jerry’s, supra note 9, at 40.
20. Greenfield and Cohen sought to create a company “dedicated to a sustainable corporate
concept of linked prosperity.” Page, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry, supra note 12, at 219. Chouinard
has stated repeatedly that he wanted to “build a company that could last 100 years.” B-Corp,
PATAGONIA, http://www.patagonia.com/eu/enCZ/patagonia.go?assetid=70725 (last visited
Apr. 7, 2013).
21. See Page, Truth About Ben & Jerry’s, supra note 9, at 40 (stating that as the company’s
financial growth began to slow down in the mid-1990s, some investors began to argue “that the
company’s social mission was a luxury it could no longer afford”).
22. See id. A tender offer is a public offer to shareholders that is higher than the current
market stock price. Page, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry, supra note 12, at 231.
23. Page, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry, supra note 12, at 226; Page, Truth About Ben &
Jerry’s, supra note 9, at 39–40.
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Cohen and Greenfield pieced together a counteroffer to
shareholders.24 Despite their best efforts, the founders could not
match Unilever’s offer.25 Afraid of the impending class action
lawsuits against them26 and the future legal consequences for not
maximizing shareholder wealth,27 the Ben & Jerry’s board (including
Cohen and Greenfield) begrudgingly accepted the buyout by
Unilever.28
As Cohen and Greenfield anticipated, once it obtained control,
Unilever promptly began to eliminate Ben & Jerry’s social
missions.29 In fact, within three years after the sale to Unilever, the
new management of Ben & Jerry’s had terminated 20 percent of the
company’s workforce and stopped distributing a 7.5 percent share of
profits to its charitable foundation.30
Although Patagonia, like Ben & Jerry’s, experienced periods of
slow growth in the mid-1990s, it has been able to avoid a fate similar
to Ben & Jerry’s.31 Chouinard ensured the longevity of Patagonia’s
social missions by maintaining Patagonia as a closely held private
company wholly owned by him and his wife.32 By doing so,

24. The Scoop on Ben & Jerry’s Sellout, SLATE (Apr. 12, 2000, 3:05 PM), http://www.slate
.com/articles/business/moneybox/2000/04/the_scoop_on_ben_jerrys_sellout.html.
25. Page, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry, supra note 12, at 225–26.
26. Id. at 229 (“Indeed, three class action lawsuits alleging that the directors were breaching
their fiduciary duties to shareholders by failing to maximize shareholder value were filed while
the [Unilever] deal was being negotiated.”).
27. Id. at 228–29.
28. Id. at 229 (“Cohen . . . [said that corporate law] ‘required the board of directors of Ben &
Jerry’s to take an offer, to sell the company despite the fact that they did not want to sell the
company.’ Greenfield agreed: ‘[W]e were a public company, and the board of directors’ primary
responsibility is the interest of the shareholders. . . . It was nothing about Unilever; we didn’t
want to get bought by anybody.’”).
29. Id. at 225–28.
30. Id. at 243 (“In the three years since 4-11 [2000], Ben & Jerry's has seen its social mission
begin to seep away—Unilever has laid off one in five B&J employees, stopped donating 7.5
percent of profits to the Ben & Jerry's Foundation, and hired a CEO Cohen didn't approve of.”
(Citation omitted)).
31. See generally Company Info, PATAGONIA, http://www.patagonia.com/us/patagonia.go
?assetid=2047&ln=140 (last visited Sept. 17, 2013) (“Staying true to our core values during
thirty-plus years in business has helped us create a company we’re proud to run and work for.”).
32. See Stevenson, supra note 12 (explaining Chouinard’s ability to grow a multimillion
dollar company without bringing in outside equity investors or borrowing substantial sums is a
rare and difficult feat). See generally James Clear, 5 People Who Turned $1,000 into $1 Million,
US NEWS (Mar. 15, 2012), money.usnews.com/money/blogs/my-money/2012/03/15/5-peoplewho-turned-1000-into-1-million (noting that “[b]uilding a million-dollar business from scratch
isn't easy . . . .”).
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Chouinard was able to eliminate the possibility that disgruntled
shareholders would file derivative actions against the board for
failing to maximize shareholder wealth.33 However, with his
retirement on the horizon, the seventy-three-year-old recently
became concerned about the long-term protection of his company’s
social missions.34
The growing concerns of socially conscious founders, like
Chouinard, combined with the unraveling of double bottom line
businesses, like Ben & Jerry’s, prompted several state legislatures to
create new corporate forms for socially concerned companies.35
These new hybrid corporate forms seek to combine elements of
traditional nonprofit and for-profit entities.36 California has emerged
as one of the leaders of this new social enterprise reform.37
Seeking to protect the legacy of his company’s social missions,
Chouinard, whose company is based in Ventura, California, took
immediate actions to take advantage of California’s new social
enterprise forms.38 In fact, Patagonia became the first company to
register as one of California’s new social hybrid entities39 when it
filed to become a Benefit Corporation40 on January 3, 2012.41
Whatever path Chouinard decides to take in the future, his
company’s social and environmental missions are now better
protected under California’s new social hybrid forms.42
This Note argues that California’s new social enterprise forms
are a necessary vehicle for socially geared businesses that seek to
33. See Stevenson, supra note 12.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., MARK DESAULNIER, ANALYSIS OF ORIGINAL BILL—SB 201 (2011), available
at www.ftb.ca.gov/law/legis/11_12bills/sb201_020811.pdf. When California lawmakers
discussed the purpose for creating the Flexible Purpose Corporation entity they cited that “[t]he
story of Ben and Jerry’s Ice Cream is an example of why a new entity form is sought.” Id. at 2.
36. See infra Part III.
37. See infra notes 132–35 and accompanying text.
38. Bart King, Patagonia Is First to Register for ‘Benefit Corporation’ Status in California,
SUSTAINABLE BRANDS (Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.sustainablebrands.com/news_and_views
/articles/patagonia-first-register-%E2%80%98benefit-corporation%E2%80%99-status-california;
John Tozzi, Patagonia Road Tests New Sustainability Legal Status, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 4, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-04/patagonia-road-tests-new-sustainability-legalstatus.html.
39. See Stevenson, supra note 12.
40. See infra notes 171–89 and accompanying text.
41. Stevenson, supra note 12.
42. See King, supra note 38; Lifsher, Businesses Seek, supra note 15.
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pursue societal and environmental missions without compromising
profits and growth, or fearing adverse financial and litigation
repercussions. Part II describes the traditional corporate forms under
California law and explains the limitations that both forms place on
social enterprises. Part III first examines two new California
corporate forms, the Flexible Purpose Corporation and the Benefit
Corporation, and one proposed California corporate form, the LowProfit Limited Liability Company, before analyzing the impact that
each of these forms could have on California social enterprises. Part
IV clarifies the need for these new social hybrids by describing how
the new forms remedy the limitations that are imposed on social
enterprises under the traditional corporate structure. Lastly, Part V
explains why California is a preferred choice for social enterprises,
illustrates how the influx of social enterprises could benefit the state,
and ultimately, proposes immediate steps California should take to
secure its position as the leader of social enterprise law.
II. BACKGROUND
To examine why Cohen and Greenfield were unable to protect
Ben & Jerry’s from a corporate takeover, it is important to
understand the traditional structure of corporate and nonprofit law.
The U.S. Supreme Court has continually restricted “the growth of
federal law into the areas of state corporate law.”43 As a result, each
state’s corporate code44 is a unique product of its own state’s
legislature.45
A. Traditional Corporate/Nonprofit Structure
Traditionally, states have required incorporating businesses to

43. See Francis J. Facciolo & Richard L. Stone, Avoiding the Inevitable: The Continuing
Viability of State Law Claims in the Face of the Primary Jurisdiction and Preemption Challenges
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 525, 548–49 (1995).
44. J. Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with Profit: Governance, Enforcement,
Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking in Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1, 9 (2011). This Note will focus on California corporate law.
45. If a conflict of law arises between two states, the “internal affairs doctrine” will apply.
Vaughn v. LJ Int’l, Inc., 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 166, 173 (Ct. App. 2009). This doctrine, which is
incorporated in California under Corporations Code section 2116, will apply the law of the state
of incorporation (with limited exceptions). 9 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW
§ 239 (10th ed. 2005).
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make an election of either a for-profit or a not-for-profit entity.46
This traditional binary system poses many problems for social
enterprises that wish to simultaneously pursue apparently
inconsistent goals: maximizing societal gains (as a nonprofit entity
would) and maximizing financial gains (as a for-profit entity
would).47
1. Nonprofit Entities
The creation of the nonprofit code was an important step for the
socially conscious businessman because it allowed a business to
pursue a social mission irrespective of profits.48 Not only did the
code initially grant managerial flexibility to socially conscious
directors,49 but the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) also granted
unique financial advantages to nonprofits.50 Most notably, the IRS
granted nonprofit organizations tax-exempt status.51 In addition, the
IRS decided that a donation to a qualifying nonprofit would yield a
tax deduction for the donor.52 As a result of these deductions, the
nonprofit form has been more likely to receive capital from
established charities or foundations.53
However, to protect against potential abuses, the IRS also
imposed several strict limitations on nonprofits.54 These restrictions
hamper a nonprofit’s ability to make a profit in several ways.55 First,
nonprofits are restricted in what activities the business can pursue,56
because nonprofits must pursue “public or charitable purposes.”57
The IRS also monitors each nonprofit to ensure that its activities
46. Felicia R. Resor, Benefit Corporation Legislation, 12 WYO. L. REV. 91, 93 (2012).
47. See infra notes 48–86 and accompanying text.
48. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). To qualify as a tax-exempt entity, the IRS actually requires
that nonprofits pursue a mission (e.g., religious or charitable) over profits. Id.
49. See id. (listing the social purposes that a nonprofit can pursue).
50. See id. § 501(a).
51. Id. Thus, a qualifying nonprofit pays no income taxes. Id. § 501(a), (c)(3).
52. I.R.C. § 170(a),(c) (2012); Christen Clarke, California’s Flexible Purpose Corporation:
A Step Forward, A Step Back, or No Step at All?, 5 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 301,
303–04 (2011).
53. See Clarke, supra note 52, at 303–04.
54. See infra notes 55–60 and accompanying text.
55. Resor, supra note 46, at 95.
56. Clarke, supra note 52, at 303–04.
57. CAL. CORP. CODE § 5111 (West 2012). These purposes must be set out in the nonprofit’s
articles of incorporation, a legal document that each California business entity must file with the
Secretary of State before it can come into legal existence. Id. §§ 200(c), 5133.
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remain within the scope of its stated charitable or public purposes.58
If the IRS determines that the nonprofit’s activities are unrelated to
its charitable purpose,59 the agency has the power to strip the
nonprofit of its tax-exempt status.60 The fear of losing their coveted
tax-exempt status keeps many nonprofits from pursuing new,
possibly profitable, business opportunities.61
Second, the nonprofit form constrains the potential earnings for
founders and directors.62 Owners and directors of a nonprofit cannot
appropriate their firm’s revenues “for their personal benefit.”63 Even
during the course of a sale, an owner is precluded from selling his
nonprofit “beyond reasonable compensation.”64
Third, nonprofits have a limited ability to expand or grow.65 A
California nonprofit cannot offer stock, equity, or even a salary to
equity investors.66 As a result, nonprofits must rely solely on
donations, debt, and retained earnings.67 With a limited pool of
donors and a strict policy of enforcing the pursuit of a charitable
mission over profitability, a nonprofit may struggle to gain the
capital it needs to expand.68
For some social entrepreneurs, the tax advantages and ability to
receive donations make the nonprofit form a viable option for their
businesses.69 However, for others, the severe restrictions on business
activities, personal earnings, and expansion make the nonprofit
58. See I.R.C. § 501(b) (2012); COMPLIANCE GUIDE FOR 501(C)(3) PUBLIC CHARITIES,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 14, 23 (2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf
/p4221pc.pdf.
59. Clarke, supra note 52, at 303–04. This income is commonly called the unrelated
business taxable income (UBTI). Id.
60. Id.
61. Robert A. Katz & Antony Page, The Role of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L. REV. 59, 83
(2010).
62. Id. at 67.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 75. Further devaluing the sale price of a nonprofit, the “nonprofit compensation is
calculated retrospectively and not prospectively. As a result, founder and controllers may decline
to sell (or ‘convert’) a nonprofit organization to a for-profit entity . . . .” Id. at 94–95.
65. See infra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
66. Katz & Page, supra note 61, at 67. A salary cannot be offered to equity investors as a
“pretext for distributing profits to them.” Id.
67. Id. at 94. Retained earnings are the revenues left over after all debts, taxes, and costs of a
business are paid off. A nonprofit is not likely to yield high retained earnings as their focus is on
charitable purposes, not profit margins. Id. at 94–95.
68. Murray & Hwang, supra note 44, at 10.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 48–53.
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model an unattractive vehicle for social enterprises.70 Thus, many
social enterprises adopt the structure of the for-profit corporation in
an attempt to fulfill the needs of their growing businesses.71
2. For-Profit Entities
Compared to nonprofits, the profit-making advantages of forprofit entities have made them significantly more popular with
Californian entrepreneurs.72 Although California offers several
different for-profit forms, the relative advantages of the corporation
and the limited liability company form have made them a perennial
favorite among modern entrepreneurs.73
Unlike a nonprofit company, a for-profit company is
unrestricted in its purpose and can engage in “any lawful business
activity.”74 Thus, a for-profit can quickly expand or diversify its
operations to capitalize on new business opportunities.75 This
flexibility to pursue different business activities generally enables
for-profits to generate higher returns than nonprofits.76 Additionally,
the California Corporations Code provides for-profits a vital source
of capital that is unavailable to nonprofits: equity investors.77 Unlike
a charitable contribution, where the donor seeks no financial return,
investors in for-profit companies buy an ownership stake78 in that
70. See Murray & Hwang, supra note 44, at 10.
71. See Clarke, supra note 52, at 310.
72. Compare
California
Counties:
Tax
Exempt/Nonprofit
Organizations,
http://www.taxexemptworld.com/organizations/california-counties
TAXEXEMPTWORLD.COM,
.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2013) (stating that there are 217,335 nonprofit entities in California),
with Number of California Small Businesses, GAEBLER.COM, http://www.gaebler.com/Number-of
-Small-Businesss-in-California.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2013) (listing that California is home to
3,320,977 small businesses).
73. See W. Derrick Britt et al., Frequently Asked Questions: The Flexible Purpose
Corporation and Senate Bill 201, BUS. FOR GOOD (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.businessforgood.co
/2011/03/frequently-asked-questions-proposed.html. “Entrepreneurs . . . have historically been
limited to two primary corporate vehicles—the corporation and the limited liability company.” Id.
For this reason, this Note will be referring to both corporations and limited liability companies
when it refers to “for-profits.”
74. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17002(a) (West 2013) (referring to the purpose of a Limited
Liability Corporation). Corporations use nearly the same language: “the purpose of the
corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity.” Id. § 202 (b)(1)(A).
75. See Murray & Hwang, supra note 44, at 21–22.
76. See id. at 10.
77. CAL. CORP. CODE § 400 (West 2013); Katz & Page, supra note 61, at 62.
78. The ownership stake is commonly referred to as purchasing stock or shares of equity.
See CAL. CORP. CODE § 184 (West 2013).
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company, and thus are entitled to receive financial returns.79 Because
for-profit entities have the potential to yield a return exceeding the
tax savings given for making an equivalent donation to a charity, the
vast majority of investors would rather invest in for-profits than
donate to nonprofits.80
The quest to maximize profits, however, does not come without
its pitfalls.81 Pursuing profits above all else commonly forces social
enterprises to sacrifice social and environmental initiatives.82
Directors of for-profit entities are required by California law to act in
the “best interests of the corporation and its shareholders.”83 If a
director acts in a way that does not adhere to this standard, the
director may be liable84 to the corporation’s shareholders for breach
of fiduciary duty.85 Fearing possible lawsuits from shareholders,
some directors forego social and environmental initiatives to comply
with the shareholder wealth-maximization norm.86
B. Unsuccessful Attempts to Bridge Binary Corporate Structure
Recognizing the weak alternatives for social ventures that were
technically neither for-profit nor nonprofit, some states attempted to
safeguard social entrepreneurs through judicially created

79. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 400 (West 2013).
80. See Jim Witkin, The L3C: A More Creative Capitalism, TRIPLE PUNDIT (Jan. 15, 2009),
http://www.triplepundit.com/2009/01/the-l3c-a-more-creative-capitalism.
81. See infra notes 82–86 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“The
corporate form in which [Defendant] craigslist operates, however, is not an appropriate vehicle
for purely philanthropic ends, at least not when there are other stockholders interested in realizing
a return on their investment.”).
83. CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (West 2013).
84. Evangeline Gomez, The Rise of the Charitable For-Profit Entity, FORBES (Jan. 13, 2012,
6:16 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/evangelinegomez/2012/01/13/the-rise-of-the-charitable
-for-profit-entity.
85. Resor, supra note 46, at 95. Fiduciary duties include serving the best interests of the
corporation in “good faith” and with “such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances.” CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 309(a).
86. See Plerhoples, supra note 12, at 239 (“[R]isk-averse directors of a social enterprise—
fearing liability for a breach of fiduciary duties—may feel obligated to recommend an acquisition
by an entity that intends to scale back or even abandon the social or environmental mission of the
social enterprise.”). Although California courts do not explicitly adopt the shareholder wealthmaximization norm, the notion is prevalent in Delaware case law. See infra notes 106–22 and
accompanying text.
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presumptions and legislatively created statutes.87 Specifically, states
tried to fashion sweeping constituency statutes88 or grant more
deference under the age-old “business judgment rule.”89 While both
the constituency statutes and the business judgment rule do provide
some additional safeguards for social ventures, neither provides
adequate protection.90
1. Constituency Statutes
Constituency statutes, if enacted by a state legislature, enable a
corporation to consider stakeholders’ and other constituencies’91
interests alongside shareholders’ interests.92 Although a majority of
states93 have passed corporate constituency statutes,94 the statutes
remain relatively untested in state and federal courts.95 With few
cases defining the scope and validity of these statutes, directors of
corporations remain wary that corporate constituency statutes will
fully protect them.96 Constituency statutes hold even less efficacy for
California businesses as California has not passed a constituency
statute.97 Simply put, overarching constituency statutes do not
provide sufficient protection to allow otherwise risk-averse directors
to make socially beneficial decisions.98

87. See infra notes 88–89.
88. ERIC L. TALLEY, CORPORATE FORM AND SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP: A STATUS
REPORT FROM CALIFORNIA (AND BEYOND),1, 3 (2012) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2144567 (follow “Download This Paper” hyperlink); see infra notes
91–92.
89. See Plerhoples, supra note 12, at 241.
90. See infra notes 91–104 and accompanying text.
91. Britt et al., supra note 73 (stating that constituencies include “shareholders, employees,
customers, suppliers, creditors, communities, society as a whole, and long-term interests”).
92. TALLEY, supra note 88, at 3 (stating that constituency statutes “provide legal protection
for corporate directors who wish to weigh stakeholder considerations alongside shareholder
return”).
93. TALLEY, supra note 88, at 4 n.7; Britt et al., supra note 73.
94. TALLEY, supra note 88, at 4 n.7 (noting that thirty states have passed constituency
statutes).
95. See Britt et al., supra note 73 (stating that “state courts have almost unanimously failed
to interpret such provisions”).
96. Id.
97. TALLEY, supra note 88, at 4; Britt et al., supra note 73. Delaware, the leader of corporate
law, also does not have an “other constituencies” statute. TALLEY, supra note 88, at 4 n.7.
98. See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text.
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2. Business Judgment Rule
The business judgment rule (BJR) is a judicially created doctrine
that presumes directors make business decisions that are in the
company’s best interest.99 California courts have recognized the BJR
as a “judicial policy of deference to the business judgment of
corporate directors in the exercise of their broad discretion in making
corporate decisions.”100 Recognizing that business directors are
better suited to make their company’s decisions than the courts, the
BJR presumption is meant to act as a shield for all prudent,
reasonable, and well-intentioned director decisions.101 However,
courts are still uncertain of the BJR’s outer boundaries,102 because
the rule offers limited protection when: (1) shareholder wealth is
sacrificed for societal gains; (2) the sale of a company is imminent;
or (3) the individual seeking to apply the rule is an officer, not a
director.103 This uncertainty often serves to narrow or constrain the
decision making of corporate managers when they are considering
the implementation of social or environmental policies for at least
three significant reasons.104
First and foremost, courts have held that the BJR offers limited
protection for company officials that place social and environmental
considerations ahead of shareholder welfare.105 Dodge v. Ford Motor

99. Clarke, supra note 52, at 317 n.157.
100. Everest Investors 8 v. McNeil Partners, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 31, 45 (Ct. App. 2003) (certified
for partial publication); Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 256 Cal. Rptr. 702, 710 (Ct. App. 1989).
California has codified the BJR presumption. Cal. Corp. Code § 309 (West 2013); Berg & Berg
Enters., LLC v. Boyle, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 875, 897 (Ct. App. 2009).
101. Clarke, supra note 52, at 317 n. 157.
102. Peter Smith, Are the Managers of Traditional Corporations “Really” Required to
Maximize Profits to Shareholders? A Review of eBay v. Craigslist et al., in the Argument
Supporting “Hybrid” Social Enterprises, APEX LAW GRP. (June 6, 2012), http://www.apexlg
.com/?p=305. (“It’s unclear where the business judgment rule’s outer boundaries are located . . .
.”).
103. See infra notes 105–126 and accompanying text.
104. See Plerhoples, supra note 12, at 248–49.
105. TALLEY, supra note 88, at 4 (stating that “for decisions that obviously sacrifice
shareholder welfare for the benefit of other considerations (including social purposes), the BJR
provides no protection”); Plerhoples, supra note 12, at 248 (stating the BJR offers “limited
protection for directors and officers who attempt to consider all business decisions in light of both
the social mission and profit motives of the corporation”); Smith, supra note 102 (stating that
“there are limits to the business judgment rule and the ability for management to consider social
and environmentally friendly policies at the expense of shareholder value in the traditional forprofit corporate structure”).
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Co.106 was the seminal case that illustrated the limitations of BJR
protection when shareholder wealth was sacrificed for a social
purpose.107 Despite yielding sufficient profits, Henry Ford, the
President and majority shareholder of Ford Motor Company,108 and
Ford Motor’s board of directors withheld a shareholder dividend and
instead reinvested the money back into Ford Motors.109 The board
intended to use the retained earnings of the company to benefit the
company’s stakeholders, particularly its employees.110 The Supreme
Court of Michigan rejected the board’s business decision, holding
that a corporation “is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders.”111 Because Ford’s decision to invest in
his employees did not directly maximize shareholder wealth, the
court found that Ford breached his fiduciary duty to his
shareholders.112 Cases protecting shareholder wealth maximization,
like Dodge v. Ford, provide a chilling effect on directors
contemplating social and environmental objectives.113
Second, the strength of the BJR diminishes greatly during the
sale or changing of control of a company.114 The Revlon Rule115
imposes “heightened judicial scrutiny”116 on directors to acquire the
“best price available” for shareholders when a change in control
becomes inevitable,117 and does not allow directors to consider a
company’s social mission.118 Likewise, the BJR presumption is
106. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
107. See id. at 684. Although this case was decided by a Michigan court, and not in
California, it still carries great weight.
108. Id. at 671.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 671–72 (stating that Ford’s actions were motivated by his ambition “to employ still
more men; to spread the benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help
them build up their lives and their homes”).
111. Id. at 684.
112. Id. at 685.
113. Although the courts of California have appeared to give little weight to this Michigan
case, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. has not been formally rejected by California courts and continues
to be directly followed by many states. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v.
Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348–49 (1986) (citing Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. to assert that
“managers, of course, must exercise the privilege in a manner consistent with their fiduciary duty
to act in the best interests of the corporation . . . .”).
114. Plerhoples, supra note 12, at 248–49; Smith, supra note 102.
115. Smith, supra note 102.
116. Plerhoples, supra note 12, at 226.
117. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986).
118. Plerhoples, supra note 12, at 226 (“Under certain circumstances, once a social enterprise
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effectively limited during hostile takeover attempts.119 The Unocal
Rule initially imposes a stricter judicial review on directors’
decisions to implement antitakeover measures.120 The policy behind
this heightened judicial standard is to protect the wealth of
shareholders from the possibly self-interested actions of directors.121
Although the Revlon Rule and Unocal Rule are not explicitly
accepted under California law, California state courts have cited to
these doctrines approvingly.122
Third, the BJR protections do not extend to corporate officers.123
Citing the clear omission of the word “officers” from section 309 of
the California Corporations Code, California’s codified version of
the BJR,124 California courts do not extend the BJR presumption to
officers of corporations.125 Some courts have even used California’s
strict interpretation of section 309 to deny directors the BJR
protection by treating them as mere officers.126
Ignoring the ambiguous boundaries of the BJR and the
shareholder wealth maximization norm, and assuming arguendo that
directors are protected from liability for pursuing a double bottom
line, the traditional corporate structure still provides inadequate
offers itself for sale, Delaware's Revlon rule would impose heightened judicial scrutiny of the
transaction and would require the directors to obtain the best sale price reasonably available,
without considering the social enterprise's social and environmental efforts.”).
119. See infra notes 120–21 and accompanying text.
120. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 1985).
121. Id. at 954. (“Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in
its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders, there is an enhanced
duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the business
judgment rule may be conferred.”).
122. TALLEY, supra note 88, at 4–5, n.9 (stating that “there appears to be no published
opinion by a California state court at any level that rejects the [Revlon] doctrine, and the handful
that cite Revlon appear to do so approvingly”).
123. Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 256 Cal. Rptr. 702, 711 (Ct. App. 1989) (stating that the
“judicial deference afforded under the business judgment rule therefore should not apply” to the
defendants because they “were acting as officer employees of the corporation”); F.D.I.C. v. Van
Dellen, No. CV 10–4915, 2012 WL 4815159, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2012) (“California courts
have not extended the [business judgment] rule to officers, and this Court declines to do so.”).
124. Berg & Berg Enters., LLC v. Boyle, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 875, 897 (Ct. App. 2009);
Gaillard, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 710–11.
125. See Berg, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 897; Gaillard, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 710–11.
126. See, e.g., Gaillard, 256 Cal. Rptr.at 711 (holding that “as a matter of law, our review of
the conduct of the inside directors is not governed by section 309” because the directors were not
“‘perform[ing] the duties of a director’ as specified in section 309”); F.D.I.C. v. Castetter, 184
F.3d 1040, 1046 (9th Cir. 1998) (referring to the same principle illustrated in Gaillard but stating
that the BJR does not apply if the director “abdicated his corporate responsibility”).
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safeguards for the long-term sustainability of social missions.127
Shareholders have a difficult time monitoring their company’s social
impact because traditional corporate forms have limited transparency
and accountability requirements with respect to social and
environmental policies.128 Risk-averse directors generally prefer
conservative stances on social initiatives for fear of shareholder
litigation.129 At times, even founders of social ventures struggle to
ensure that their company’s social missions will not suffer from
“mission creep,” the eventual discontinuation of that social mission
over time.130
III. CALIFORNIA’S NEW HYBRID ENTITIES
As the Ben & Jerry’s story illustrates, the traditional
black-and-white distinction between for-profit and nonprofit does not
provide adequate protection or guidance in the evolving area of
social enterprise law. Recognizing the limitations and restraints
posed on socially geared for-profit organizations, several states have
begun to develop a legislative model that blends attributes of
traditional for-profit and nonprofit entities into “hybrid”
organizations.131
Chief among these states is California, which has emerged as a
leader of this new social enterprise law.132 California is the only state
to allow a business to incorporate as a Benefit Corporation (“B
Corp”) or a Flexible Purpose Corporation (FPC).133 Additionally, the
127. See infra notes 128–30 and accompanying text.
128. Resor, supra note 46, at 99.
129. Plerhoples, supra note 12, at 248–49 (“[E]ven if the business judgment rule would
provide liability protection for specific business decisions based on the dual objectives of the
corporation, directors remain risk-averse and take conservative positions due to the threat of
litigation.”); Britt et al., supra note 73 (“Because these rules are judicially created and interpreted,
and because litigation is prevalent, even where judicial guidance exists, directors and their
lawyers tend to apply risk-averse interpretations.”).
130. Katz & Page, supra note 61, at 95–96. Mission creep is also referred to as “legacy
problems,” “mission drift,” or a lack of a “mission anchor.” It relates to the fact that even if the
company is able to pursue its social missions while making a profit, the social purpose is at risk
of changing or even disappearing with the addition of new management. Resor, supra note 46, at
99.
131. See L3C Tally, INTERSECTOR PARTNERS, L3C, http://www.intersectorl3c.com/l3c_tally
.html (last updated Aug. 24, 2014); State by State Legislative Status, B LAB, http://www
.benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status (last visited Sept. 28, 2014).
132. See infra notes 237, 241, and accompanying text.
133. TALLEY, supra note 88, at 1.
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state legislature has proposed a third type of hybrid entity—the LowProfit Limited Liability Company (“L3C”).134 The creation of these
hybrid entities now protects socially responsible California
corporations, like Patagonia, and provides directors with protection
to pursue social and environmental causes.135
The FPC became law in California on January 1, 2012.136 As of
January 2013, California remains the only state to have passed
legislation authorizing the FPC.137 Senator Mark DeSaulnier
introduced the FPC in Senate Bill 201—The Corporate Flexibility
Act of 2011—on February 8, 2011.138 The FPC was the “brainchild
of the California Working Group for New Corporate Forms,”139 a
group of ten California lawyers dedicated to giving greater flexibility
to socially responsible for-profit businesses.140 It appears that
California businesses have been a bit cautious in adopting this new
form, as only thirty-one California companies have registered to
become FPCs in the first seventeen months since the law’s
enactment.141
Sponsored by assembly member Jared Huffman and the
American Sustainable Business Council,142 California passed the
Benefit Corporations Code on the same day that the FPC was

134. S.B. 323, 2011–2012 Leg. § 17701.02 (Cal. 2011).
135. See B CORPORATION, 2012 B CORPORATION ANNUAL REPORT 27 (2012), available at
http://www.bcorporation.net/sites/all/themes/adaptivetheme/bcorp/pdfs/BcorpAP2012_WebVersion.pdf (“B Corp enshrines Patagonia’s nearly 50 year old model of business into law. And
that makes it easier for other businesses to adopt this model and use it in their own search for
stewardship and sustainability.”).
136. DEBRA BOWEN, SECRETARY OF STATE, TWO NEW TYPES OF CORPORATIONS EFFECTIVE
JANUARY 1, 2012 (2011), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/business/be/forms/flexible-purposecorp-and-benefit-corp.pdf.
137. It is worth noting that the state of Washington has adopted an entity called the “social
purpose corporation.” Page, Truth About Ben & Jerry’s, supra note 9, at 42. Despite the different
titles, the language of Washington’s social purpose corporation is very similar to the language of
California’s FPC. Compare CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2500–3503 (West 2013) (specifying the
requirements for California’s FPC ), with WASH. REV. CODE §§ 23b.25.005–.25.150 (West 2013)
(specifying the requirements for Washington’s social purpose corporation).
138. Clarke, supra note 52, at 321.
139. David Adelman, Just What California Needs: A New Corporate Form, L.A. LAW., Apr.
2011, at 68, 68.
140. Clarke, supra note 52, at 316.
141. DEBRA BOWEN, SECRETARY OF STATE, SUPPLEMENTAL LANGUAGE REPORT BUDGET
LETTER 12-16 (2013), available at www.sos.ca.gov/admin/reports/2013/flexible-purpose
-corporations-report.pdf.
142. State by State Legislative Status, supra note 131.
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adopted into California law—January 1, 2012.143 On a national and
state level, B Corp legislation has been more widespread than the
FPC.144 Maryland became the first state to adopt the B Corp in
2010.145 There are now twenty-six states that have passed B Corp
laws146 and twelve more states that have proposed B Corp
legislation.147 Since enactment, over one hundred companies have
registered as California B Corps.148
The L3C was the first profit/nonprofit hybrid entity adopted in
the United States.149 After Vermont adopted its legislation in 2008,
eight other states enacted L3C legislation.150 Entrepreneur Robert
Lang championed the notion of the L3C after he became the CEO of
his family’s foundation.151 The L3C concept is now being introduced
and promoted in various state legislatures by the Americans for
Community Development (a group funded by Lang’s foundation)
and L3C Advisors.152
A. Flexible Purpose Corporation
Unlike traditional corporate entities, the Flexible Purpose
Corporation153 form allows California businesses to freely pursue
social or environmental objectives without exposing directors to
liability for not maximizing profits.154 Expanding the protection of
traditional for-profit forms, the FPC protects directors, shareholders,
and stakeholders of socially conscious businesses in three significant
ways.
First, the FPC allows a company to pursue one or more “special
143. BOWEN, supra note 136; TALLEY, supra note 88, at 4 n.4.
144. See TALLEY, supra note 88, at 6.
145. See Plerhoples, supra note 12, at 224 n.22.
146. State by State Legislative Status, supra note 131. The District of Columbia has also
passed B Corp legislation. Id.
147. Id.
148. BOWEN, supra note 141. Data was measured from January 2012 to June 2013. Id.
149. See Clarke, supra note 52, at 312.
150. See L3C Tally, supra note 131.
151. Malika Zouhali-Worrall, For L3C Companies, Profit Isn’t the Point, CNN MONEY
(Feb. 9, 2010,
10:49 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/08/smallbusiness/l3c_low_profit
_companies. Lang felt the need to create the L3C model so that private foundations, like the one
he ran, could donate “Program-Related Investments” to charitable organizations. Id.
152. Witkin, supra note 80. Lang and other early adopters created L3C Advisors to help
jumpstart and finance other L3Cs. L3C Advisors was the first L3C created. Id.
153. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2500–3503 (West 2013).
154. See infra notes 155–58 and accompanying text.
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purposes”155 in addition to simply maximizing profits.156 The FPC
code gives great flexibility to what constitutes a special purpose.
Specifically, this special purpose can be a “charitable or public
purpose activit[y] that a nonprofit public benefit corporation is
authorized to carry out,” or a means to improve or advocate for the
FPC’s employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, community,
society, or the environment.157 This flexibility shields directors from
personal liability if they make decisions that favor the company’s
special purpose over the company’s financial profits.158
Second, in addition to aiding socially conscious directors, the
FPC code also ensures full disclosure and adequate transparency to
socially conscious shareholders. FPCs must send an annual report to
all shareholders.159 The report must contain a balance sheet, income
statement, statement of cash flows, and a report from independent
accountants (if the company used one).160 Moreover, an FPC must
issue a “[special purpose] management discussion and analysis,”
which identifies and evaluates how the company is meeting its
special purpose objectives.161 These extensive and detailed reports
provide an added measure of transparency and accountability that a
traditional for-profit corporation is not required to provide.162
Third, the long-term protection from mission creep163 better
safeguards stakeholders’ interests.164 In fact, a supermajority vote of
at least two-thirds is required to eliminate or drastically alter the
FPC’s special purpose,165 convert the FPC into a solely for-profit
corporation,166 sell substantially all of the FPC’s assets,167 merge the
155. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602(b)(2) (West 2013). “Special purpose” is a term unique to the
FPC. See id. § 2513; Clarke, supra note 52, at 318–19.
156. A special purpose must be specified in the articles of incorporation. Clarke, supra note
52, at 318 –19.
157. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602(b)(2)(A)–(B) (West 2013).
158. Clarke, supra note 52, at 319.
159. CAL. CORP. CODE § 3500 (West 2013).
160. Id. § 3500(a).
161. Id. § 3500(b). If the board withholds expenditures that might relate to the company’s
special purpose, the company will also have to issue a “special purpose current report.” Id.
§ 3501.
162. See Resor, supra note 46, at 99.
163. See supra text accompanying note 130.
164. See infra notes 165–69 and accompanying text.
165. CAL. CORP. CODE § 3002(c) (West 2013).
166. Id.
167. Id. § 3100.
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FPC into a corporation,168 or reorganize the FPC.169 When businesses
are organized as FPCs, owners feel secure that their companies’
special purpose(s) will survive in the long-term, even in the event of
a sale, merger, or reorganization.170
B. Benefit Corporations
Similar to an FPC, a Benefit Corporation171 allows its directors
to pursue a dual purpose without constantly fearing legal
ramifications for actions that may not maximize shareholder
wealth.172 However, the B Corp has some distinct differences from
the FPC that provide even more transparency to a B Corp’s
shareholders and the general public. While appearing to give similar
protection to directors as the FPC, the B Corp requires a more
structured and defined social purpose.173 A B Corp requires that a
company pursue a “general public benefit,”174 which must have a
“material positive impact on society and the environment.”175 In
addition to a general benefit, a B Corp may also identify any
“specific public benefit” in its articles of incorporation that it wishes
to pursue.176
The biggest difference between the FPC and the B Corp is that
the B Corp provides added transparency and enhanced accountability
to shareholders.177 Unlike the FPC, which gives nearly unfettered

168. Id. § 3201.
169. Id. § 3401.
170. See supra notes 165–69 and accompanying text. See also B Corp, PATAGONIA,
http://www.patagonia.com/eu/enCZ/patagonia.go?assetid=70725 (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
(quoting Chouinard stating that California’s new social enterprise legislation “creates the legal
framework to enable mission-driven companies . . . to stay mission-driven through succession,
capital raises, and even changes in ownership, by institutionalizing the values, culture, processes,
and high standards put in place by founding entrepreneurs”).
171. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14600–31 (West 2013).
172. See infra notes 173–76 and accompanying text.
173. TALLEY, supra note 88, at 5.
174. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14610(a) (West 2013).
175. Id. § 14601(c). While the text of section 14601(c) technically states “society and the
environment” (emphasis added), it practically refers to a material benefit on the environment,
shareholders, employees, customers, or the community. See Clarke, supra note 52, at 319.
176. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14601(e), 14610(b) (West 2013).
177. Compare id. § 3502(b) (mentioning FPCs are given the benefit of a presumption if they
use “best practices” to measure their special purpose), with id. § 14601(c) (stating that B Corps
must have a “material positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole, as
assessed against a third-party standard”).
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discretion to its directors to measure its social purpose initiatives, the
B Corp requires an independent third-party evaluation.178 This
annual comprehensive assessment179 analyzes whether the B Corp
benefit corporation dutifully fulfilled its identified public
benefit(s).180 Accompanying the annual third-party evaluation, a
California B Corp must also send out a comprehensive annual report
to all its shareholders.181 Unlike the annual report required for an
FPC, the B Corp’s “benefit report” must contain the following: a
“narrative” describing how the B Corp selected its third-party
standard and how it pursued its general public benefit(s) and specific
public benefit(s),182 “an assessment of [its] overall social and
environmental performance,”183 and the “name of each person that
owns 5 percent or more of [the company’s] outstanding shares.”184
Lastly, the B Corp creates additional safeguards for socially
conscious shareholders.185 Specifically, the entity creates a new right
of action called a “benefit enforcement proceeding.”186 A
shareholder, director, individual, or an entity explicitly mentioned in
the bylaws or articles of incorporation, or the B Corp itself may bring
a benefit enforcement proceeding187 if the B Corp fails to pursue one
of its listed general or specific public benefits, or fails to deliver its
annual benefit report to shareholders.188 Additionally, a two-thirds
supermajority vote is required to eliminate or amend the B Corp’s
special purpose.189
C. Low-Profit Limited Liability Company
Differing greatly from the organizational structure of the B Corp
178. Id. § 14601(g) (“‘Third-party standard’ means a standard for defining, reporting, and
assessing overall corporate social and environmental performance.”). Id. Two companies that are
commonly used for the “third-party standard” are B Lab and Global Reporting Initiative. Resor,
supra note 46, at 110.
179. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(g)(1) (West 2013).
180. Id.
181. Id. § 14630.
182. Id. § 14630(a)(1).
183. Id. § 14630(a)(2).
184. Id. § 14630(a)(3).
185. See infra notes 186–89 and accompanying text.
186. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14623 (West 2013).
187. Id. § 14623(b).
188. Id. § 14601(b).
189. Id. §§ 14601(d)(1)(B); 14610(d).
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and the FPC, the last hybrid model, the L3C, offers very distinct
advantages to social entrepreneurs.190 Although the L3C concept has
not been enacted in California, it was proposed on February 14,
2011, in Senate Bill 323.191
Similar to the other hybrid entities, the L3C allows directors to
pursue a social purpose, and therefore, directors do not need to be
solely concerned with maximizing shareholder wealth.192 However,
unlike the other California hybrid models, profits cannot be a
significant purpose of the company.193 Instead, the primary purpose
of the L3C must be to accomplish a charitable or educational
purpose.194
Although this restriction on profits may serve to limit capital
investments from traditional investors, the L3C concept was created
to increase the total capital available for social entrepreneurs,195
primarily through IRS-sanctioned Program Related Investments
(PRIs),196 which are loans or investments from private, charitable
foundations.197 To qualify as a PRI, “the investment must relate to
the Foundation’s mission and the risk/reward ratio must exceed that
of a standard market-driven investment.”198 Because the main goal of
for-profit companies is to make money—a goal that is incompatible
with most foundations’ charitable missions—the L3C creates the first
for-profit entity that is PRI compatible.199 Additionally, the ability of
the L3C model to make actual returns for investors might attract new
190. See infra notes 195–99 and accompanying text.
191. S.B. 323, 2011–2012 Leg. (Cal. 2011). As of December 2012, the provisions of Senate
Bill 323 that include the L3C entity have not been enacted into California law. CAL. S. JOURNAL,
2011–2012 Recess 5137 (2012).
192. See S.B. 323 § 17701.02 (j) (Cal. 2011).
193. Id. § 17701.02(j)(2). Nor can the appreciation of property be a significant purpose. Id.
194. Id. § 17701.02(j)(1)(B). Specifically, the primary purpose must be for “religious,
charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international
amateur sports competition . . . or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals.” 26 U.S.C.
§ 170(c)(2)(B) (2012).
195. Neetal Parekh, What is an L3C? (Low-Profit Limited Liability Company),
INNOV8SOCIAL (Oct. 31, 2011), www.innov8social.com/2011/10/what-is-l3c-low-profit
-limited.html.
196. Id.
197. Resor, supra note 46, at 104; Zouhali-Worrall, supra note 151.
198. Witkin, supra note 80 (emphasis omitted).
199. Clarke, supra note 52, at 309; Zouhali-Worrall, supra note 151. In fact, “[t]he New
York-based Foundation Center estimates that PRIs made up less than 1% of the charitable
distributions made by foundations in 2006 and 2007.” Id.

HYBRID ENTITIES

642

9/29/2014 10:51 AM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:619

socially driven investors who want to be socially responsible, but
lack the resources to simply donate to traditional nonprofits.200
IV. HYBRIDS FIX LIMITATIONS OF TRADITIONAL
CORPORATE STRUCTURE
As demonstrated in this section, the FPC, B Corp, and L3C
forms provide greater (1) protection, (2) transparency, (3)
accountability, and (4) sustainability than the traditional corporate
structure. By addressing these four limitations of the traditional
corporate structure, these new social hybrids not only afford
directors, founders, and officers increased legal protection but also
promote confidence to pursue a double bottom line.
A. Greater Protection
Directors and officers of these hybrids can enjoy managerial
flexibility that was not previously available to companies using the
traditional corporate structure.201 The restrictive traditional corporate
structure has made managers of both for-profits and nonprofits leery
of making decisions that might have maximized their company’s
social and financial gains.202 Managers of traditional nonprofits were
forced to restrict their managerial decisions to conform to the strict
IRS rules governing nonprofits.203 Managers of traditional for-profits
were forced to second-guess managerial decisions in lieu of the
strong shareholder wealth maximization norm and the murky
boundaries of the BJR.204 Formally codifying the language of the
new structures in the California Corporations Code finally gives
risk-averse managers and directors of social enterprises the
confidence to make informed social and financial decisions without
fearing adverse IRS ramifications or possible litigation from
shareholders.205

200. See Murray & Hwang, supra note 44, at 22.
201. See Reiser, supra note 2.
202. Id. at 609 (“Rather than fearing litigation, the founder of a for-profit social enterprise
may instead worry about locking in a dual mission legacy, about sufficient access to capital, or
both.”). Id. at 610.
203. Britt et al., supra note 73.
204. See supra notes 95–97, 104, and accompanying text.
205. Britt et al., supra note 73.
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B. Greater Transparency
The reporting standards required for California’s new social
enterprises provide more transparency than a traditional corporation
is required to provide.206 A traditional for-profit could claim it was
“socially good” or “environmentally green” without really
quantifying its impact on the society or the environment.207 The
requirements of the FPC and the B Corp do not permit such
unsubstantiated claims because both hybrid forms require
comprehensive annual reports that detail the societal impact of a
company’s social initiatives to all shareholders.208 In fact, the creator
of the FPC corporate code “believes strongly these requirements will
provide a strong incentive for better reporting, greater detail, and
better explanation of efforts undertaken, permitting far better
monitoring of greenwashing than is possible today.”209
In addition to promoting and incentivizing companies to provide
more detailed reports on social missions, the requirements on social
impact reporting have also accelerated the area of social impact
accounting.210 Several prominent organizations, like B Lab or Global
Reporting Initiative,211 have recently proven that they can effectively
assess a company’s fulfillment of its social or environmental
purpose.212 Additionally, the Sustainability Accounting Standards
Board “is creating standard social accounting tools in the same
manner that the Financial Accounting Standards Board created
206. Id. (stating that with the “additional transparency requirements, shareholders will now
possess important information for determining whether a company is working in a manner and
with appropriate efficacy to achieve its stated Special Purpose”).
207. Id. (“[T]he proposal’s requirements for public transparency and reporting on its efforts
and success towards achieving its Special Purpose provide the opportunity for more facts than
previously included in the marketplace for determining the real impact of a company’s claims of
achieving ‘green’ or ‘good’ results.”).
208. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 3500, 14630 (West 2013).
209. Britt et al., supra note 73.
210. Note that California courts have not developed a set standard for measuring social
impact accounting. See Britt et al., supra note 73 (stating that there “exist[s] no single accepted,
well-established standard for measurement of SROI, but rather multiple emerging standards.”);
Plerhoples, supra note 12, at 256 (“[A]lthough no standard measure for social impact accounting
yet exists, best practices have emerged.”).
211. See Resor, supra note 46, at 110.
212. As discussed above, this independent third-party approval is already required for
California’s Benefit Corporations. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(g) (West 2013). The third party is
required to assess the B Corp’s impact on its employees, subsidiaries, suppliers, customers, the
community, and the local and global environment. Id. §§ 14601(g)(1); 14620(b)(2)–(5).
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standards for financial accounting.”213
C. Greater Accountability
These new transparency requirements also place more
accountability on the managers and directors of California’s modern
social enterprises.214 Equipped with a new wealth of information,
shareholders of these social enterprise forms now possess several
ways to hold managers accountable for their social and
environmental actions.215 First, shareholders can vote off board
members that do not adequately promote the company’s social
missions.216 Second, shareholders can resort to selling their stock in
the company, which may ultimately reduce the company’s capital.217
Third, shareholders can now bring a lawsuit for breach of fiduciary
duty against directors who fail to follow the social purposes
articulated in the company’s articles of incorporation.218 Armed with
these options, shareholders can better serve as “watchdogs” to ensure
the stated social objectives are carried out.
D. Greater Sustainability
The additional legal protection and accountability standards of
California’s new hybrid forms also serve to protect the long-term
sustainability of social enterprises. Mission creep219 is a common
fear for founders of many social ventures.220 Indeed it was this fear
that led the Ben & Jerry’s founders, Greenfield and Cohen, to oppose
Unilever’s takeover.221 The fear of mission creep can prevent owners
from making beneficial decisions for their social enterprises.222 For
213. See Plerhoples, supra note 12, at 257.
214. Id. at 259. (“This increased transparency is meant to give shareholders the ability to hold
the flexible purpose corporation's directors and officers accountable for their actions . . . .”).
215. Id. (stating that “dissatisfied shareholders can attempt to vote out the board or exit the
firm themselves by selling their shares.”).
216. See id.
217. Id.
218. Britt et al., supra note 73 (stating that “the law always permits shareholders to file suit
for a director’s breach of fiduciary duties, something that will now include (equally and in the
same manner) a failure to adhere to the agreed Special Purpose as it currently applies to failures
to sufficiently emphasize financial returns”).
219. See supra text accompanying note 130.
220. See Katz & Page, supra note 61, at 95–96.
221. See The Scoop on Ben & Jerry’s Sellout, supra note 24.
222. TALLEY, supra note 88, at 5.
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example, fearing the eventual loss of a social purpose, some founders
may refuse to give up control of their companies and thus decline to
entertain the issuance of new stock, merger negotiations,
management changes, or a much overdue retirement—all decisions
that might better the overall performance of their company.223 The
requirements of the new California social forms directly recognize
and alleviate founders’ external and internal fears of mission creep.
A founder or director under a traditional corporate structure may
be concerned that a designated social purpose will succumb to an
external force (i.e., a merger, major reorganization, or a management
change).224 Founders and directors of FPCs, B Corps, or L3Cs need
not have this worry, however, as all of California’s new social forms
require the social purpose to be explicitly listed in the social
enterprise’s articles of incorporation.225 Furthermore, the B Corp226
and the FPC227 offer an additional layer of protection to the longterm sustainability of social missions, as both require a supermajority
vote of at least two-thirds to change any stated social purpose.228
Social sustainability is further increased because the new social
enterprises put shareholders and potential shareholders on notice of
what they are actually buying in to.229 Whether it is the social and
environmental purposes directly set out in each company’s publicly
available articles of incorporation or the distinction of being an FPC,
B Corp, or L3C, all shareholders should be aware that these
companies are designed to pursue a double bottom line, which may
or may not align with shareholder profit maximization.230 As such,
traditional investors (who focus only on the financial bottom line)
should temper their expectations for financial returns or, more
simply, choose not to invest in these dual-purpose entities. In all
223. See Resor, supra note 46, at 99, 108.
224. See Plerhoples, supra note 12, at 235–36 (referencing several examples of socially
conscious businesses (e.g., Tom's of Maine, Inc., Burt's Bees, Inc., and Ben & Jerry's) that were
acquired by profit-driven multinational corporations).
225. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2602(b)(2), 14610(b) (West 2013).
226. Id. § 14610(d).
227. Id. § 3002.
228. See supra notes 226–27.
229. Plerhoples, supra note 12, at 250 (“At the same time, the statement of special purpose in
the corporate charter puts the world and investors on notice that both financial and non-economic
values will be pursued.”).
230. Id. at 250 n.147.
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likelihood, most investors of these hybrid corporations will be
socially conscious investors who measure returns in more than just
financial terms.231 These investors are less demanding of financial
returns than traditional investors, and are thus more likely to have
greater and longer-lasting patience for and understanding of
directors’ decisions that do not maximize profits.232
V. WHY SHOULD CALIFORNIA BECOME THE
LEADER OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE?
In addition to the creation of new hybrid forms, social
entrepreneurship might also benefit from a state assuming a
leadership position in the development of social enterprise law.233
California’s unique cultural and social landscape already makes it an
attractive location for social enterprises.234 California should
continue to take steps to encourage social ventures to incorporate
within the state because of the possible financial, environmental, and
societal impacts these businesses might generate.
A. How Social Enterprises Can Benefit from California
California is a strong, if not the ideal, candidate to become the
leader of social enterprise law in the United States for three reasons.
First, California already offers one of the most diverse and
“tantalizingly unique” selections of social enterprise forms.235
Second, California’s large economy and physical geography make it
an appealing location for new and existing businesses.236 Third,
231. See id. at 227. (“Persons or entities most likely to invest in flexible purpose
corporations—namely, impact and social investors—do not want shareholder value prioritized
over social and environmental considerations.”).
232. See Jon Carson, Creating an Edge with Mission: Competitive Advantages of For-Profit
Social Enterprises, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 26, 2012, 1:10 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/jon-carson/creating-an-edge-with-mis_b_1452162.html (“Social enterprises may receive
slightly more patience and buy-in from investors, especially if they themselves are mission
driven.”).
233. See Page, Truth About Ben & Jerry’s, supra note 9, at 43.
234. See infra notes 235–37 and accompanying text.
235. TALLEY, supra note 88, at 4. In addition, the largest business (in terms of revenue
generated) to have incorporated as a social enterprise company is California’s own Patagonia.
Felicity Carus, Patagonia: A Values-Led Business from the Start, GUARDIAN (July 17, 2012,
11:21 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/sustainable-business/patagonia-values-led-business
-benefit-corp (stating that “Patagonia now has $600m in annual revenues . . . making it the largest
company so far to sign as a benefit corporation”).
236. See infra notes 243–46 and accompanying text.
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California’s strong long-arm statute provides added protection for
businesses that incorporate within the state.237
1. Diverse Array of Business Entities
No other state offers the same variety of hybrid enterprises that
California does.238 In fact, there are only five other states (Illinois,
Louisiana, Rhode Island, Utah, and Vermont) that offer more than
one form of social enterprise.239 All three of these states offer B
Corps and L3Cs, but none offer the FPC.240 Without the IRS’s
automatic qualification for L3Cs to qualify as PRIs, the L3C form
provides very few advantages over the B Corp.241 Thus, at the
moment, California is the only state that provides two uniquely
advantageous vehicles for social enterprises.242
2. Large Economy
California’s large size (both in terms of population and
geography) has prompted many companies to relocate or do business
within the state’s borders.243 In fact, California is the national leader
in “registered firms (incorporated or not), employees, and
payroll.”244 The state is also a leading source of venture capital
funding and private equity financing.245 Most importantly, California
currently is home to more companies that seek to pursue a double
bottom line than any other state.246 Armed with a wealth of resources
(human capital, financial capital, and natural capital) and a
trailblazing attitude towards socially conscious businesses,247
California serves as an ideal location for new social enterprises.

237. TALLEY, supra note 88, at 4 n.3.
238. See infra notes 239–41 and accompanying text.
239. See L3C Tally, supra note 131; State by State Legislative Status, supra note 131.
240. See supra note 239; see also TALLEY, supra note 88, at 1 (stating that “California’s
experiment is unique” because it is the first state to offer both the FPC and the B Corp forms).
241. The primary purpose for creating the L3C was to “attract program related investments
(PRIs) from foundations.” Resor, supra note 46, at 104.
242. See supra notes 238–41 and accompanying text.
243. See TALLEY, supra note 88, at 3.
244. Id.
245. See Britt et al., supra note 73.
246. Id. (stating that California contains “more companies seeking to mix mission and money
than any other state”).
247. See supra notes 243–46 and accompanying text.
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3. Protective Long-Arm Statute
California has one of the most “comprehensive” long-arm
statutes of any state.248 California grants jurisdiction to its courts “on
any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the
United States.”249 The sweeping language of California’s long-arm
statute imposes no additional limitations on state courts that are not
already outlined in the constitutions.250 Accordingly, courts have
held that California’s statute “authorizes the broadest possible
exercise of judicial jurisdiction.”251 This low jurisdictional threshold
helps protect California businesses because it makes it easier for
California businesses to bring lawsuits within the state.252 By doing
so, California businesses can avoid costly and time-consuming
litigation in foreign states.253
B. How California Can Benefit from Social Enterprises
California’s emergence as a leader of social enterprise law will
not only help the development of socially conscious businesses, but
it could also assist the state financially. In fact, after the enactment of
the B Corp into law, sponsor Jared Huffman stated, “With this new
law, we are attracting new socially conscious companies, investors
and consumers—we’re sending a strong message that California is
open for this emerging form of business.”254 Huffman hopes that
California’s strong pro–social enterprise atmosphere will incentivize
social entrepreneurs to create or move their socially conscious
businesses within California’s borders.255 This migration of social
enterprises into the state would infuse more money into the local

248. John A. Gorfinkel & Richard A. LaVine, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in California Under
New Section 410.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1163, 1166 (1970).
249. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2013).
250. Quattrone v. Superior Court, 118 Cal. Rptr. 548, 551 (Ct. App. 1975).
251. Id.
252. See generally VEDDER, PRICE, KAUFMAN & KAMMHOLZ, P.C., LONG-ARM STATUTES:
A FIFTY-STATE SURVEY 18, 18–19 (2003) available at http://euro.ecom.cmu.edu/program/law/08
-732/Jurisdiction/LongArmSurvey.pdf (referencing several cases that illustrate the strength of
California’s long-arm statute).
253. See id.
254. Lifsher, Businesses Seek, supra note 15; Patagonia Registers as First California Benefit
Corporation, B LAB (Jan. 3, 2012, 12:30 PM), http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/33565Patagonia-Registers-as-First-California-Benefit-Corporation.
255. Lifsher, Businesses Seek, supra note 15.
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economy and ultimately create a larger tax base for the state.256
Specifically, an influx of new social enterprises into California
would (1) create more jobs, (2) open up new sources of capital for
entrepreneurs, (3) generate new taxes, and (4) decrease local and
state governments’ spending on social and environmental initiatives.
1. Create New Jobs
Social enterprises that relocate into the state to take advantage of
California’s new hybrid structures would likely need local workers to
operate.257 Even if companies decide only to incorporate in
California and not relocate operations, this incorporation activity
should result in increased work and, correspondingly, more jobs for
various state departments.258
2. Unlock New Sources of Capital
These new social enterprise forms will also likely open up new
sources of financing and capital.259 Specifically, these new social
enterprise forms will be attractive for impact investors,260 social
investors,261 venture philanthropy firms,262 responsible investing
funds,263 and private foundations.264 Although these sources of
impact investing encompass significantly less capital than traditional
for-profit sources, social investing has been steadily increasing in
recent years.265 In fact, a report by The Forum for Sustainable and

256. See infra notes 259, 277–79 and accompanying text.
257. See Lifsher, Businesses Seek, supra note 15.
258. See MARK DESAULNIER, ANALYSIS OF ORIGINAL BILL – SB 1463 3 (2010), available at
www.ftb.ca.gov/law/legis/09_10bills/SB1463_021910_040510.pdf (“Staff has determined that
implementing this bill would have a significant impact to the department because of the new
workload for collectors to collect tax, process tax clearance letters, retrain staff, and an increased
number taxpayer calls.”).
259. See Plerhoples, supra note 12, at 252–53.
260. Impact investors make investments that “create positive impacts and social and
environmental benefits beyond financial returns.” Id. at 253.
261. Social investors seek to make investments that have minimal “negative social and
environmental impacts.” Id.
262. Venture philanthropy firms function like venture capital firms. However, venture
philanthropy firms only acquire and distribute capital to social enterprises. Id. at 252–53 n.162.
263. Responsible (or sustainable) investing funds make investment decisions using
“environmental, social, and governance (‘ESG’).” Id. at 252.
264. Private foundations maintain a set of core social missions and make investments that
relate and promote their socially geared missions. Id. at 253.
265. See id. at 252 n.161.
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Responsible Investment (“US SIF”) found that sustainable and
responsible investing increased by nearly 16 percent in 2011 to a
total of $80.9 billion.266
Moreover, if the IRS should permit L3Cs to automatically
qualify as PRIs (which California’s L3C code intentionally mirrors),
California investors could also tap into previously unavailable capital
from private foundations.267 Currently, to keep its tax-exempt status,
a private foundation is required to distribute a certain percentage (at
least 5 percent268) of its assets each year.269 Foundations can
distribute their money in only two ways: (1) donate to nonprofit
entities, where there is no possibility of financial return; or (2) invest
in for-profit entities through PRIs, which allow financial returns.270
With the L3C being the only for-profit entity that is meant to qualify
as a PRI, this emerging hybrid form could attract substantial new
capital from an otherwise relatively untapped source.271
3. Generate New Taxes
Even if social enterprises do not physically relocate their
operations or headquarters into the state, California could still profit
from social companies incorporating in the state. Delaware’s
expansive case law and pro-business codes have made it the leader in
corporate business law.272 As a result, corporations commonly
incorporate in Delaware even if they have little, if any, business

266. Id. “According to a report by the US SIF Foundation, $80.9 billion was invested by 375
sustainable and responsible investment funds in the beginning of 2011, representing a 15.9%
increase from 2010.” Patrick Mitchell, Study: “Alternative Investment” Assets in Sustainable &
Responsible Investing Jumped 16 Percent in 2010, US SIF (Oct. 26, 2011),
http://ussif.org/news/releases/pressrelease.cfm?id=181.
267. Ron Shoemaker & Bill Brockner, Public Charity Classification and Private Foundation
Issues: Recent Emerging Significant Developments, in IRS EXEMPT ORGANIZATION CPE TEXT
FOR FY 2000 140, 140 (1999), available at http://www.pgdc.com/pdf/CPE-FY2000.pdf (stating
that “private foundations have been hard pressed to meet their 5% minimum distribution
requirement under IRC 4942”).
268. I.R.C. § 4942(e) (2012).
269. Resor, supra note 46, at 104; Deborah B. Andrews, The ‘L3C’: The New Double-Hybrid
Entity, PHILANTHROPY J. (Dec. 10, 2010), http://www.philanthropyjournal.org/resources
/managementleadership/%E2%80%98l3c%E2%80%99-new-double-hybrid-entity.
270. Witkin, supra note 80.
271. See Parekh, supra note 195.
272. LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., DEL. DEP’T OF STATE, WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE
1–3, 10 (2007).
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activities within the state.273 This process has been very financially
beneficial for the state of Delaware.274
Like a corporation that is incorporated in Delaware, a social
enterprise that is incorporated in California can operate or hold its
headquarters in any state.275 Thus, California can benefit from
franchise taxes on social enterprises that are incorporated but not
doing business in California.276 Currently, both B Corps277 and
FPCs278 are treated as corporations under California’s Corporation
Tax Law and taxed at a franchise tax rate of 8.84 percent.279
4. Decrease the State’s Social and Environmental Burden
Lastly, an influx of social enterprises into the state would likely
benefit the environment and local communities in California. These
societal and environmental gains could reduce the tax burden and
financial obligations of local and state governments, and ultimately
allow the government to spend its coveted resources on other
deserving areas.280
C. Steps California Needs to Take
Recognizing the extensive benefits that the state of California
273. See id. at 1.
274. Id. (“The people of Delaware are aware that the income received from corporation
franchise taxes is an important part of the state budget and that Delaware law firms that specialize
in business law matters employ significant numbers of people.”). In fact, Delaware’s franchise
taxes account for nearly 18 percent of the state’s revenues every year. See STATE OF DELAWARE,
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, DELAWARE FISCAL NOTEBOOK 29 (2011), available at http://www
.finance.delaware.gov/publications/fiscal_notebook_11/fiscal_notebook_11.pdf.
275. Page, Truth About Ben & Jerry’s, supra note 9, at 43 (“When a form has been enacted in
one state, it is available to residents of every state.”).
276. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23153(b)(1) (West 2012) (stating that “[e]very corporation
that is incorporated under the laws of this state” has to pay a franchise tax).
277. JARED HUFFMAN ET AL., FRANCHISE TAX BOARD, ANALYSIS OF AB 361 (2011),
www.ftb.ca.gov/law/legis/11_12bills/ab361_Final.pdf.
278. DESAULNIER, supra note 35.
279. 2014 California Tax Rates and Exemptions, STATE OF CALIFORNIA FRANCHISE TAX
BOARD, https://www.ftb.ca.gov/forms/2014_California_Tax_Rates_and_Exemptions.shtml?WT
.mc_id=Business_Popular_TaxRates (last visited Sept. 27, 2014).
280. For example, a company keeps a manufacturing plant in a city to help bolster its local
community. Providing steady jobs for an otherwise struggling city could be very advantageous as
this could reduce government expenditures that commonly result from unemployment. See Marc
Lifsher, Unemployment Payouts Push California Deeper into Debt, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2010),
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/06/business/la-fi-jobless-fund-broke-20101107 [hereinafter
Lifsher, Unemployment Payouts] (stating that the state of California is “borrowing $40 million a
day from the federal government to provide assistance to jobless workers”).
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could receive if it does truly become the leader in social enterprise, it
is important that California continues to take the necessary steps in
advancing its social enterprise law. To maintain its leadership
position, California needs to stay educated and informed on new,
emerging hybrid forms, continue to fortify the protection of social
enterprises and their directors, and possibly incentivize current
for-profit entities to convert to social enterprises. At the current
moment, California should take the following three steps to
accomplish these goals: (1) pass L3C legislation, (2) develop clear
case law on the new social enterprise entities, and (3) consider tax
breaks for social enterprises incorporated in California.
1. Pass L3C Legislation
The first step California should pursue is to repropose and pass
L3C legislation.281 While the L3C does not offer any distinct
advantages over California’s FPC or B Corp at the moment, it will be
a very significant social enterprise model if the IRS decides to grant
an automatic PRI qualification to this form of business entity.282
Although this IRS qualification is not certain to be adopted,283 it
would still benefit California to become familiar with the entity (as
California should be prepared to have first-mover advantage should
the IRS adopt the PRI qualification).
2. Develop Social Enterprise Case Law
The more difficult step for California is to develop clear case
law surrounding its new social enterprise entities. To date, no state or
federal court has taken on the validity of these new hybrid entities.284
If the California state courts could tackle the validity of these hybrid

281. The L3C legislation could mirror the L3C language from S.B. 323, a bill that proposed
the L3C form in California in 2011 but ultimately was never passed. See supra note 191.
282. Parekh, supra note 195; Zouhali-Worrall, supra note 151. Although California’s
requirements for L3Cs mimic the exact language as the IRS requirements for a PRI, the IRS has
not yet recognized L3Cs as automatically qualifying PRIs. Anne Field, IRS Rule Could Help the
Fledgling L3C Corporate Form, FORBES (May 4, 2012, 11:32 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites
/annefield/2012/05/04/irs-rules-could-help-the-fledgling-l3c.
283. L3C’s, B Corps and Social Enterprises, GILLESPIE L. GROUP BLOG (Apr. 12, 2011),
http://gillespielawgroup.com/our_blog/2011/l3cs-b-corps-and-social-enterprises (noting that the
IRS has given “no indication that they will do so in the near future”).
284. See Resor, supra note 46, at 113 (stating that no court has taken on the validity of B
Corps yet).
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models in court, social enterprises would know what to expect during
litigation and have clear standards on how to conduct their affairs.285
Setting this legal precedent would instill confidence and trust in riskaverse entrepreneurs, directors,286 and socially conscious
investors,287 encouraging them to use California’s new hybrid
entities.
3. Consider Tax Breaks
To encourage more companies to incorporate in California, the
California state legislature should also consider tax breaks for these
new social enterprise forms.288 Specifically, the state could lower its
franchise tax on these new hybrid forms. Currently, California taxes
FPCs and B Corps under the same franchise tax rate as general
corporations and Limited Liability Companies,289 despite the societal
and environmental benefits that the social enterprises will
undoubtedly provide for the state. Tax incentives for creating jobs in
California or relocating headquarters to California should also be
considered.290
VI. CONCLUSION
For years, the story of the takeover of Ben & Jerry’s has served
as a cautionary tale for socially conscious businesses across the
nation.291 The plight of Cohen and Greenfield illustrates the limited
protections that the traditional corporate structure provides to social
entrepreneurs. Yet, in the wake of an emerging body of social
285. See TALLEY, supra note 88, at 10 (suggesting that an “absence of developed case law”
might be a reason why the uptake rates of California’s new hybrid entities have been relatively
modest).
286. See Plerhoples, supra note 12, at 264 (“To the extent that directors are risk-averse, the
lack of corporate law precedent is a true barrier to the proliferation of these new corporate
forms.”).
287. See id. at 226 (“[C]ourts adjudicate issues facing these new corporate forms to create a
body of case law, this author predicts that social entrepreneurs and social investors will remain
wary of using the new corporate forms for their businesses.”).
288. See, e.g., Gomez, supra note 84 (“While benefit corporations do not enjoy any federal or
state tax benefits that are equivalent to charities, B-Corps were granted tax breaks by the City of
Philadelphia.”).
289. 2011 California Tax Rates and Exemptions, supra note 279.
290. Maureen Gorsen, California Proposes to Create New Corporate Entity for
Environmentally/Socially Conscious Companies, ALSTON & BIRD, LLP TAX BLOG
(Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.alston.com/taxblog/blog.aspx?entry=4399.
291. Jenna Lawrence, Making the B List, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Summer 2009 at 66.
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enterprise statutes, the story of Ben & Jerry’s may now serve to
demonstrate how far social enterprise law has advanced. Indeed, Jeff
Furman, the current chairman of Ben & Jerry’s,292 recently illustrated
how the creation of social enterprises has altered the corporate
governance landscape: “If benefit corporations had existed back in
2000, the [Ben & Jerry’s] board probably wouldn’t have agreed to
the Unilever deal.”293 Confirming his confidence in the new
protections afforded to social enterprises under the evolving
California laws, Ben & Jerry’s recently followed Patagonia’s lead
and incorporated as a B Corp.294
With several states adopting their own hybrid structures, it is
now up to socially conscious businesses to take advantage of the
distinct benefits offered by each of these new social enterprise forms.
If flexibility is important to a social enterprise, convert to an FPC.295
If social image is critical, convert to a B Corp.296 If access to capital
from foundations297 is vital, convert to an L3C.298 No matter which
of these new hybrid forms is selected, directors and officers will have
the freedom to pursue a double bottom line without the burden of
strict IRS compliance or the fear of shareholder litigation for not
maximizing profits.
Already equipped with the most diverse menu of social
enterprise forms—the FPC, the B Corp, and legislation for the
292. Furman was also a director of Ben & Jerry’s during the buyout by Unilever. Angus
Loten, With New Law, Profits Take a Back Seat, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2012, at B1.
293. Id. (quoting Loten who is paraphrasing a statement made by Jeff Furman).
294. Ben & Jerry’s Joins the B Corp Movement!, BEN & JERRY’S, http://www.benjerry.com
/company/b-corp (last visited Apr. 7, 2013); Joe Van Brussel, Ben & Jerry's Becomes B-Corp
Certified, Adds Credibility to Impact Investing Movement, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 25, 2012,
10:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/23/ben-and-jerrys-b-corp-impact-investing
_n_2005315.html (stating that Ben & Jerry’s is “the first and only wholly-owned subsidiary of a
public company to become a B-Corporation”).
295. See Kyle Westaway, New Legal Structures for 'Social Entrepreneurs', WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 12, 2011, 12:42 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702034133045770
88604063391944.html (stating that the FPC is an ideal form for companies that want “to do good
on their own terms").
296. See id. (stating that the B Corp form is ideal for companies that “want to create a
measurable positive impact”).
297. Foundational investors are nonprofit entities that donate capital to support various
charitable or mission driven organizations. See, e.g., Foundation Fact Sheet, BILL & MELINDA
GATES
FOUNDATION,
http://www.gatesfoundation.org/Who-We-Are/General-Information
/Foundation-Factsheet (last visited Apr. 11, 2013) (listing mission driven organizations that the
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation has donated to in recent years).
298. See Britt et al., supra note 73. This is assuming California passes the L3C legislation.
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L3C—California has emerged as an early trailblazer of social
enterprise law. In addition to accommodating social entrepreneurs,
California’s focus on promoting social enterprises might also benefit
the average Californian citizen.
However, even if these new social enterprise forms fail to
ultimately create a substantial amount of new jobs or tax revenues
for the state of California, these entities provide a critical message
for socially conscious individuals: California is open for social
enterprise. Directors: Your social and environmental actions can now
be protected. Entrepreneurs: You can now sell, reorganize, or merge
your company without the fear of mission creep. Investors: You can
now finance businesses that connect the moral causes you support
with a more desirable financial return. Socially conscious
businessmen and businesswomen: Welcome to California.
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